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SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS AS A FINANCIAL INNOVATION –  
AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 
 Thomas Holtfort, Andreas Horsch and Martin Oehmichen 
ABSTRACT 
 
By the end of July 2017, the Peterborough Social Impact Bond (SIB) pilot, the world’s 
first SIB, was declared a success.  This is expected to spur future SIB activities. Against 
this backdrop, we examine Social Impact Bonds with respect to typical structures of this 
financial innovation, its delimitation from comparable financial products, and early 
market development. Furthermore, an evolutionary economic analysis of SIBs is con-
ducted in order to explain the different market stages, conditions and patterns of SIBs in 
various countries. Analyzing the respective institutional change, we identify various 
drivers of SIBs’ evolution so far. 
 
 
Keywords – Public Sector Innovation, Private Investment, Social Impact Bonds, Social 
Services 
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INTRODUCTION 
The qualification of children with learning disabilities, the rehabilitation of reoffending 
juvenile delinquents or the integration of migrants are examples of current social chal-
lenges, for which necessary institutional structures are widely underdeveloped. Even in 
so called developed countries, governments find it increasingly difficult to offer appro-
priate (social) services in these areas, as numerous crises put their budgets under severe 
stress. Social Impact Bonds (hereafter: SIBs) could represent a welcome (financial) in-
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novation to solve the increasing asymmetry of amounting governmental obligations and 
stagnating public funds. 
SIBs – also called "pay-for-success" financing – offer an innovative way to finance par-
ticular, preferably preventive programs in the social sector with the help of private in-
vestors. The repayment of invested capital is undetermined insofar as it depends on the 
success of the financed project (impact investing). Unfortunately, the term “bond” is 
misleading in a financial context. Traditionally, a bond means that a corporate or sover-
eign body raises debt capital by issuing tradable securities, thus called “public” debt. 
SIBs however, are no variation of the aforementioned public debt securities. Instead, 
they represent an innovative form of private, more equity-like venture capital based on 
an intersectoral cooperation or multi-stakeholder partnership (Fraser et al., 2016; Arena 
et al., 2015; Charlton et al., 2013; McHugh et al., 2013; Nicholls and Tomkinson, 
2013): Involved parties usually are at least one social service provider, private investors, 
and the tsate. The aim of their (financial) cooperation is to ex ante prevent or ex post 
alleviate a specific social problem (Edmiston and Nicholls, 2017; von Schnurbein et al., 
2015; Scheuerle et al., 2013; Liebman, 2011). 
The aim of this article is to depict the structures, market development and drivers of the 
evolving of this financial innovation. After differentiating SIBs from comparable finan-
cial instruments, we present a first classification of SIBs (part 2). Based hereupon, part 
3 presents an analysis of the evolving SIB market. Finally, an evolutionary economic 
analysis of this financial instrument is conducted, focusing the problems of “social en-
trepreneurship”, “knowledge” and “emergence of new infrastructures”, to help explain 
the rather heterogeneous state of SIBs in different countries or regions (part 4). The fifth 
and final chapter concludes. 
 
STRUCTURES AND DELIMITATION OF SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 
 
According to Social Finance (an intermediary organization in the UK designed to 
bridge funding gaps and raise external social investment to fund preventative pro-
grams), a SIB is an institutional design that is based on a financial contract between one 
or several private investors with an institution of the public sector in which a commit-
ment is made to pay for improved social outcomes that result in public sector savings 
(Social Finance, 2010). As in other financial structures, several players are involved in a 
standard SIB financing, who might not be part of its financial sphere, but nevertheless 
are interested in benefiting from the project (Child et al., 2016; Gustaffson-Wright et al., 
2015): 
 
 The favored target group for whom social services are provided (e.g. long-term 
unemployed, young people with behavioral problems; short-term prisoners). 
 The social service (social entrepreneur), who provides the service. This could be 
a non-profit organization as well as a profit-/return-/value-oriented supplier. 
• The investors who finance the intervention and take the default risk. The inves-
tors are at least interested in the social impact of the project, and most probably 
also in the financial return this project success means for them. 
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• The state that hopes to cut costs and thus guarantees the payment of the inves-
tors (only) in case of success. It therefore takes no financial risk for a possible 
failure of the SIB. 
• Financial intermediaries (e.g., banks or foundations) that examine the feasibility 
of a SIB and help synchronize supply and demand or capital for social projects 
at the SIB market. Additional services can include the modeling and creation of 
the financial instrument as well as the supervision of the investment over the 
term. 
• In addition, independent experts who either monitor and refine the intervention 
during the implementation phase or check in how far the agreed impact was 
achieved with the help of key figures, may be involved. 
 













6. Compares outcome and calculates savings
7. Presents achievements




1. Negotiate terms of SIB agreement
9. Payment (if goals achievend)






Figure 1: General structure of an SIB agreement (ABN Amro, 2015; Tan et al., 2015) 
 
In its financial core part, a SIB is a private funding (steps 2, 3) of a project in the social 
sector (e.g. education), which has been negotiated between a special purpose intermedi-
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ary and a responsible government institution (“SIB backer”, e.g. the ministry of educa-
tion, step 1). Based hereupon, a social entrepreneur is chosen as a servicing agent and 
mandated to execute the project (steps 4, 5). If the entrepreneur’s actions achieve the 
intended success for the target population (according to independent rating institutions, 
steps 6, 7), the SIB backer pays the special purpose institution (step 8), which in turn 
pays the SIB investors (step 9). Consequently, investors receive payments only insofar 
as a) the originally intended social impact and b) cost savings for the government are 
achieved, while the party paying the SIB issuer (and, indirectly, its SIB investors) can 
be either the service organisation itself or the governmental body which had financed 
the project otherwise and now has profited from lowered expenditures (Scheuerle et al., 
2013). Figure 2 illustrates the main actors and processes of a SIB with regard to the in-




Without SIB With (sucessful) SIB





Saving of SIB Backer 
Cost for SIB Backer








Figure 2: Cost comparison (Weber and Petrick, 2013) 
In addition to efficiency gains, SIBs’ stakeholders can benefit from various advanta-
geous features of SIB financing. E.g., investors could benefit from returns that are com-
parably high (given the quasi-sovereign bond in a low interest environment) or correla-
tions with standard asset classes that are comparably low. As well, the impact-oriented 
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use of public funds conforms to the preferences of the state and the taxpayer, while the 
preventive instead of repairing approach is preferred by the social entrepreneur, the 
state, and society alike (CNBC, 2017; Gustaffson-Wright et al., 2015; Schäfer and 
Höchstötter, 2015; McHugh et al., 2013). As any (particularly: investment) project, 
SIBs promise these benefits not without antipodes. The risk potential of SIBs is particu-
larly due to the newness of this kind of institution and the consequential lack of 
knowledge. 
Although the expression “bond” suggests that SIBs are based on debt, the financing’s 
character in fact is mezzanine (Bolton and Savell, 2010): Pure debt financing (Brealey 
et al., 2016, pp. 597-617) would include: 
 
• a nominal amount provided, 
• which is repaid after a fixed maturity; 
• interest payments that do not depend on the debtor’s economic success; 
• being shielded against debtor’s loss by the subordination / liability of equity in-
vestors 
• no management power. 
SIB investors contribute nominal amounts based on a contract with limited maturity and 
have no decision rights (steps 1, 2, 5). However, their returns explicitly depend on the 
success of the project they financed. Furthermore, they bear the financial risk in case of 
the project’s failure, as debt service would cease in case of the project failing. Both fea-
tures (3, 4) make an SIB-investment more equity- than debt-like, so that a SIB is a mix-
ture of both, i.e. a kind of hybrid or mezzanine finance (for the mixed character of mez-
zanine capital, see Nijs, 2013). 
Compared to other forms of finance that combine (features of) equity and debt, SIBs 
shows similarities as well as differences, making it a (mezzanine) financial structure of 
its own kind: 
 
• With regard to the core institutional design, SIB financing resembles project fi-
nancing insofar as in both cases, debt service payments to investors depend on 
the success of one particular project and are paid by a project-specific organisa-
tion (special project/purpose company or social services provider). However, 
project finance is as well cashflow-based as return-oriented (recently, Subrama-
nian and Tung, 2016), while “success” in a SIB-context depends on other than 
classic economic key figures (e.g. in an improved employment rate). 
• The not-for-profit-attitude of investors resembles donations (and types of crowd 
financing based hereupon, see e.g. Belleflamme et al., 2014). Donations repre-
sent a seminal type of private investments in the social sector, and could be pro-
vided in monetary and non-monetary ways, e.g. as voluntary work (Spiess-Knafl 
and Jansen, 2014). Unlike SIBs however, donations are not attached to a repay-
ment obligation. Furthermore, (donation type) crowd financing differs from 
SIBs by the number of contributors (and the amount per contribution), which is 
usually large (small) in crowdfunding and small (large) with SIBs (Lawton and 
Marom, 2013).  
• Finally, the involving of private investors in a task or project that were tradition-
ally conducted by a governmental body, is a common feature of SIBs on the one 
hand and Public Private Partnerships (hereafter PPP) on the other. But while in 
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a PPP the state acts as principal / direct contract partner of the private partner 
(Delmon, 2014; Moszoro and Gasiorowski, 2008) and shares the projects’ risks 
with them, it takes no risk of failure of a SIB project, but leaves the respective 
risk exposure to SIB-investors. 
With respect to their financial side, SIBs can be distinguished from these traditional 
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Table 2: Impact-oriented financing versus similar forms of financing 
 
Obviously, not any governmental project or task is suitable for SIB finance. Instead, a 
project has to show certain characteristic features which qualify it for a SIB solution 
(Azemati et al., 2013; Liebman, 2011):  
 
• Measurable net benefits (outcome for taxpayers and investors) 
• Measurable outcome / impact (for the target group) 
• Sufficient popularity and (risk-adjusted) return to attract investors 
• Well defined treatment populations, outcomes etc. 
• Credible impact assessments 
• Credible debt service commitment of governmental body 
• Safeguards against harming the treatment population 
 
The more certain and distinctive those features are for a project, the less risks have to be 
taken into account by involved stakeholders (e.g. financial risk of the government, 
transaction cost and information risks of the social service provider, political/budgetary 
risk of the investor, e.g. Gustaffson-Wright et al., 2015; McHugh et al., 2013). The risk-
ier the project, the more crucial is the question if the government would take part of the 
financial risk or support alternative risk management solutions. After having presented 
the aforementioned definition, characteristics, and criteria, we now can describe and 
evaluate the evolution of SIB markets as of today. 
 
 MARKET DEVELOPMENT - THE EARLY YEARS 
The first SIB was launched in March 2010 in the UK by Social Finance (which itself 
had been founded in 2007) and the Ministry of Justice in order to finance a rehabilita-
tion program for prisoners of the Peterborough prison of a scheduled program volume 
of 5 million £ (Social Finance, 2010). The aim of the project named ONE Service was 
to break the cycle of re-offending and re-imprisonment of short-sentence prisoners. The 
SIB raised sufficient investment money to fund the intended services for 3,000 prisoners 
leaving Peterborough prison (in the planned period from 2010 to 2016), while investors 
faced an impact-dependent payment scheme (Nicholls and Tomkinson, 2013): 
 
• investor would receive a financial return of 2.5 percent p.a. if there was a 7.5 
percent reduction in re-offending when measured against a matched control 
group 
• higher reduction rates in re-offending would generate higher financial returns, 
staggered to a maximum of 13.3 percent p.a. 
• reduction rates of less than 7.5 percent would cause not only zero interest, but 
also zero repayment, distinguishing this SIB significantly from a classical bond: 
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“If the outcomes do not improve, investors lose their investment.” (Dorsett 
2017, 4). 
 
The results for the first two cohorts of 1.000 prisoners each in 2014/2015 demonstrated 
an average final 9 percent reduction compared to a control group, so above the overall 
7.5 percent, but lower than the 10.0 percent for immediate payments (Ministry of Jus-
tice UK, 2014). In 2015, the premature termination of the project was decided (the Pe-
terborough SIB was originally intended to operate until 2016) due to the roll-out of 
Transforming Rehabilitation reforms to probation. The latter was incompatible with the 
SIB’s layout as it made supervision for short-sentenced prisoners mandatory. Besides, 
measuring the SIB’s success was distorted by the national comparison cohort now re-
ceiving governmentally funded support. Consequently, the SIB was terminated, and 
investors were refunded already in 2015 before the total program volume of 5 million £ 
had been drawn down (Disley et al., 2015; Disley & Rubin, 2015). While key parties 
involved have declared this pilot SIB a complete success as well as a blueprint for fur-
ther SIBs (e.g. former British PM Brown, 2017; Social Finance, 2017), the cutoff as 
well spurred negative assessments doubting the success and innovative impact of the 
Peterborough SIB (e.g. The Guardian, 2014; Sharman, 2016). Although Peterborough 
worked as a door-opener for numerous SIBs in the UK and elsewhere hereafter, it also 
made the key problem of measuring the success of social projects – i.e. defining and 
measuring success indicators correctly and unambiguously – obvious (Dorsett, 2017, 
with respect to Jolliffe and Hedderman, 2014; see also The Guardian, 2014). 
Paralleling the British pilot project, SIBs had spurred the interest of US authorities even 
on the highest level: Already in February 2010, President Obama suggested to provide 
US$ 100 million from the federal household budget of 2012 for the testing of impact-
oriented financing instruments (Liebman and Sellman, 2013; McKinsey, 2012). After 
this initial proposal was rejected by US Congress, he repeated his attempt by requesting 
US$ 109 million for 2013, and was rejected again. But meanwhile, SIB-directed activi-
ties on the local and state level had turned out successful: The first SIB in the US was 
commissioned in 2013 with a volume of US$ 9.6 million by the city of New York to 
reduce recidivism of ex-prisoners. This project was discontinued in August 2015 due to 
the falling apart of the control group, the pulling out of non-financial stakeholders and 
general budget cuts (Cohen and Zelnick, 2015).  
Further pilot SIBs were launched in different countries inside and outside the European 
Union: In Australia the first SIB (volume AUS$ 7 million) was initiated by the financial 
authority of New South Wales (NSW) in 2013 with the aim to avoid out-of-home care 
for 400 families with at-risk children. The early success of the NSW based project has 
led governments across the country to rethink how they fund, test and deliver social 
services with a boost from private investors (Wilkes, 2017). In the Netherlands, which 
hereafter turned into another important SIB market according to total SIB volume, the 
first SIB was launched in 2013, helping 160 unemployed young people in Rotterdam 
without basic qualifications to get a job or go back to school. The project caused early 
successes in such a way that many members of the target group found new jobs or start-
ed their own businesses and has subsequently led to further SIB projects (ABN Amro, 
2015). 
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CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
 
Although the issuing of SIBs has increased rapidly since 2013, SIBs are still among the 
most recent financial innovations. And while interest is growing, their number and 
scope remains easy to survey. Table 3 includes those 60 SIBs, which were announced 
from 2010 to (June) 2016 worldwide, amounting to a total financial volume of more 
than US$ 200 million (Social Finance, 2016), by country of origin, number, and volume 
of SIBs.  
 
Country Total volume in 
mill. US$ 
Number of SIBs Year of first issue 
US 121.4 10 2013 
UK 57.4 31 2010 
Australia 16.0 2 2013 
Netherlands 8.7 5 2013 
Israel 7.6 2 2015 
Sweden 1.2 1 2016 
Austria 1.1 1 2015 
Canada 0.9 1 2014 
Finland 0.7 1 2015 
Germany 0.3 1 2013 
Belgium 0.3 1 2014 
India 0.3 1 2015 
Switzerland 0.3 1 2015 
Peru 0.1 1 2015 
Portugal 0.1 1 2015 
Table 3: Total volume in mill. US$ and number of SIBs worldwide as of June 2016 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016; Social Finance, 2016; Gustaffson-Wright et al., 2015; von 
Schnurbein et al.; 2015) 
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• Numbers of SIBs by country: In the beginning, SIBs were mainly observed in 
Anglo-American countries as the UK, USA, Australia and Canada (McHugh et 
al., 2013; Weber and Scheck 2012; Liebman, 2011). While between 2010 
(launch of the first SIB) and 2012 just 14 SIBs were issued, the number has 
more than tripled to altogether 46 SIBs worldwide between 2013 and Mid-2016. 
As SIBs still are in an early stage of development, their majority is still to be 





Figure 3: Number and volume in million US$ of SIBs worldwide by sector as of June 
2016 (Social Spider CIC, 2017; Social Finance, 2016) 
 
• Number of SIBs by sector: Figure 3 mentions only four social services areas, il-
lustrating that so far most SIBs were developed for social welfare activities and 
employment projects, whereas SIBs in the areas of criminal justice and educa-
tion exist, but are still rather underrepresented. Other fields of social services – 
e.g. welfare of the elderly, welfare of the mentally ill, or fire services – have not 
featured a SIB project yet. 
 
• Volume of SIBs by sector: The Social Welfare sector shows the highest volume 
with US$ 116.6 million, followed by the Criminal Justice sector with US$ 53.5 
million (here above all two large-scale ex-offenders projects in US with a vol-
ume of US$ 13.5 mill. and 21.3 mill.). Although the Employment sector can 
prove a higher number of SIBs, volume (US$ 36.5 mill.) is lower than for Crim-
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Figure 4: SIB capital raise by issue (in million US$) by region as of June 2016 
(Social Finance, 2016) 
 
• Volume of SIBs by region: So far, most SIB capital has been raised in North 
America (the USA and Canada) as Figure 4 above demonstrates, including the 
largest single SIBs worldwide, totalling US$ 21 million in January 2014, and 
US$ 30 million in February 2016. Compared herewith, a rather different dimen-
sion of European SIBs becomes obvious, as the typical European SIB ranges 
from € 100.000 to 1.2 million in continental Europe and from £ 1 to 2 million in 
the UK. Consequently, the United States are the largest SIB market, if transac-
tion volumes instead of transaction numbers are considered 
 
While the previous numbers already show important patterns of SIB development, fur-
ther insights can be derived from a project perspective. However, a respective synopsis 
is limited by the reporting behavior of SIBs. As of mid-2016, only 22 projects world-
wide have reported performance data (information about social impact), with 21 pro-
jects indicating positive social outcomes and 4 projects (three in UK and one in US) 
already having fully repaid investor capital (Social Finance, 2016). 16 of the 22 projects 
use administrative data for measuring success (based on past government data, but no 
direct comparison), while the others refer to comparative data, i.e. to a comparable 
group of people not benefitting from the activities funded via the respective SIB. The 
subsequent table 4 assembles the aforementioned 22 reporting SIBs in a synopsis with 
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In its first six months, this Social 
Impact Bond worked with 86 
young people alongside 7 secon-
dary schools, helping 68% of par-
ticipants into employment with 
100% job retention. Financial data 











The Social Impact Bond was fully 
repaid to investors with final re-











Investors have been fully repaid 
with final returns anticipated in 
2016. 
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Payment against targets is increas-
ing consistently by quarter and is 
in line with targets. 
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holding company and will be recy-















Early payments from Manchester 
City Council to the Social Impact 
Bond vehicle have been made and 












St. Basils have moved more than 
100 young people into stable ac-
commodation and more than 50 
have entered education. Financial 
data is not available. 
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moved into stable accom-
modation, more than 20 have en-













Local Solutions have moved more 
than 50 young people into stable 














Improved behavior and attitude at 
school for the first cohort of 161 
at-risk 14-15 year olds. Financial 












Worked with 1,126 new patients, 
3% above target in year 1. 83% of 
patients have continued in year 2. 
On average, wellbeing has im-
proved by four points for 197 pa-
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tients based on the Well-being Star 
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Bloomberg Philanthropies’ $6 
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kindergarten readiness results for 

















Results from the first 21 months 
show that the principal metric, the 
numbers of entries into care, was 
27% lower than the control group, 
with helpline and safety assess-
ment metrics again showing an 
increase. Final investor returns will 

















As of June 2015, investors have 
received returns of 8.9% p.a. based 
on a cumulative restoration rate for 














Initial results demonstrate that 
59% of the first cohort (80 total 
participants) are no longer on ben-
efits. Financial data is not availa-
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Table 4: Overview of the 22 worldwide SIB´s with first social impact information as of 
June 2016 (based on data taken from Social Spider CIC, 2017; Social Finance, 2016; 
Gustaffson-Wright et al., 2015) 
Considering the market developments in the aforementioned countries until mid of 
2016, it seems obvious that each country is in a different development stage with regard 
to the number and volume of SIBs, the experience so far and the number of investors. 
Hence, an evolutionary economic analysis of these circumstances is carried out in the 
next chapter. 
 
EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
As shown above, usage and reception of SIBs differ among different countries so far. 
To explain this heterogeneity and to deduct reasons and recommendations for those who 
want to support SIB development, economic theory provides useful insights. As we fo-
cus the evolution of a new institutional design, in particular evolutionary economic ap-
proaches appear promising. Evolutionary Economics fully emerged in the 1980s, focus-
ing the role of knowledge, its transformation and its limitations for the economy (Nel-
son and Winter, 1982), while it was based on the seminal contributions of the Austrian 
School and others, in particular the theory of entrepreneurship of Schumpeter (Schum-
peter, 1934), the market process theory of von Hayek (von Hayek, 1945) and the theory 
of institutional change of North (North, 1990).  
The evolutionary approach with reference to the SIB markets in UK, US and Germany 
is to be hypothesized and analyzed below under various relevant criteria which can ex-
plain the triggered system change: 
 
• the concept of the social entrepreneur, 
• the knowledge component by human actors, 
• the market-ready implementation of knowledge, 
• favorable (or unfavorable) conditions, 
• the design of formal and informal rules. 
 
Based on the “creative destruction” of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, that mainly re-
fers to a new combination of production factors by this human actor, combined with a 
displacement of old structures within the economy (Schumpeter, 1934), social entrepre-
neurship means an entrepreneurial activity, which is used in an innovative and long-
term way to solve social problems and includes a social mission, meaning that mission 
related impact becomes the central criterion instead of wealth creation (Dees, 1998). 
Other than the business entrepreneur, the environment of the social entrepreneur offers 
no clear definition of products and prices. Furthermore, the test of successful business 
entrepreneurship is the creation of a viable, growing, and wealth generating business, 
while the test of social entrepreneurship, in contrast, maybe a change in the social dy-
namics and systems that created and maintained the problem (Alvord et al., 2004). The 
concept of entrepreneurship not only applies to the entrepreneur in the classical sense, 
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but also to actors in governmental institutions (High and Pearce, 1993; North, 1990, pp. 
73-104). According to the evolutionary approach, the state is represented by its human 
representatives, who do not act in the public interest, but their own interest. Conse-
quently, these actors also try to be innovative to enhance their personal success, being 
measured by their salary, the size of their budgets or their personnel, the number of 
votes or other indicators of their political or bureaucratic career. This view could there-
fore help explain the supposedly public promotion of SIBs by human action (seminal, 
von Mises, 1949, pp. 242-260 and passim). 
In accordance with Schumpeter, five types of innovations can be distinguished (Schum-
peter, 1934, p. 66): product area, process area, organizational changes, new business 
models and technological changes. According to this systematization, SIBs stand for an 
innovation in many ways. It is a new problem solution for an old problem, namely the 
implementation of social tasks by the state. To this end, a new organizational structure 
(multi-stakeholder partnership) is being developed by the state (which adapts its busi-
ness model to this extent). The desired result is also attempted in other ways (process). 
As a result, new (investment) opportunities for investors are created (product). 
Social entrepreneurship, as already defined and delimited, has a particular tradition in 
the UK (Türk et al., 2013). With the start of the new millennium, UK social enterprises 
have become the most established (measured by the number) in Europe (Volkmann et 
al., 2012). In the year 2000 the first Social Investment Taskforce was constituted (UK 
National Advisory Board, 2014) to support social entrepreneurs in the creation and 
growth. Accompanying, in 2002, the UK government developed a definition which de-
scribes social enterprises as follows: „A social enterprise is a business with primarily 
social objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the busi-
ness or in the community, rather than being driven by the need to maximize profit for 
shareholders and owners” (Department for Trade and Industry UK, 2002). In order to 
promote a further increase of social enterprises, the British state has also taken a number 
of measures. For example, a Social Entrepreneurship Unit has been set up on govern-
ment level, which is intended to improve the framework conditions for social enterpris-
es in close cooperation with stakeholders in the sector (Türk et al., 2013). Thus, in the 
UK favorable conditions for social entrepreneurship and thus a foundation for a social 
culture (as an informal rule according to North) were set by the government comparably 
early. 
A further relevant point for explaining the advantageous circumstances in the UK and 
the US is the individual willingness to donate (which is driven by personal motives, but 
also by tax incentives for donations provided by the government). Traditionally, UK 
and also US citizens donate significantly more than people in other countries (GfK, 
2011). Analysing donor behavior in UK and US in detail, it can be observed that educa-
tion is of great importance, with at least 10 percent share of the total donations (Europe 
as a whole 5 percent). In Germany, on the other hand, more donations are spent for dis-
aster relief and religious organizations (27 percent) than for poverty reduction and 
health research. Closely related to the donation behavior in UK is the Gift Aid decree 
from 1990, which was substantially amended by the Finance Act 2000 (UK Govern-
ment, 2016). Gift Aid is a UK tax rule designed to incentivize donations by individuals 
to charities (in the UK, and, since the Finance Act 2010, also for non-profit organiza-
tions in the EU). A further measure, which has been launched by the UK government in 
this context is the Social Investment Tax Relief (SITR) introduced by the Finance Act 
2014. The objective is to encourage individual investment in small social enterprises 
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and to provide a 30 percent income tax deduction for the amount invested. SIB invest-
ments are eligible in this context (GAA Accounting, 2015). 
The development of a SIB market and the establishment of knowledge in the sense of 
von Hayek (von Hayek, 1937) require coordination and networks. In the US and the 
UK, financial experts have already been cooperating for considerable time with state 
actors and the third sector to establish institutions that allow for a functioning SIB mar-
ket and thereby incentivize the inflow of capital into social projects, as they promise 
more attractive risk-return-positions than in earlier scenarios (Social Finance, 2016; 
Weber and Scheck, 2012). Most foundations that conduct impact investing in the US are 
either sponsored by Ashoka (a non-profit organization to promote social entrepreneur-
ship founded in 1980) or are members of the Mission Investors Exchange (hereafter 
MIE), which is an information and advanced training platform (tools, studies, webinars, 
training) as well as a network of foundations (meanwhile the network covers over 250 
foundations and affiliate members, see Mission Investors Exchange, 2016). The MIE as 
a SIB-specific organization enhanced awareness of Mission Investing (inter alia through 
PR campaigns) and also acts as a lobby organization (Johnson and Lee, 2013; McKin-
sey, 2012) so that information asymmetries between interested parties can be reduced. 
Likewise, the knowledge of impact investing can be shared and developed, according to 
insights of market process theory. 
In the UK, Social Finance was founded 2007 (closely linked to the beginning of the 
financial crisis) with the aim to develop the market for social investments (see chapter 
3). The nonprofit organization was funded by various philanthropists and foundations 
and works with an interdisciplinary team of experts, including investment professionals, 
strategy consultants and experts from the social sector (Social Finance, 2010). On the 
one hand, the mission of this team is to develop innovative financial products, such as 
the launch of the first SIB or other vehicles in the form of venture capital funds or funds 
of funds. On the other hand, Social Finance should act as adviser to investors, product 
providers, socially-motivated companies and the government, and publish in those 
fields (Social Finance, 2010; 2016). Thus, Social Finance (meanwhile there is Social 
Finance UK, Social Finance US and Social Finance Israel) contributes as a classic in-
termediary that reduces transaction costs (e.g. search costs) and information asymmetry 
between the parties involved by collecting, processing, and providing information (on 
theories of intermediation, see Greenbaum et al., 2015). Thus, intermediaries like Social 
Finance can help to enhance investor confidence by valuing specific outcomes and by 
providing transparency, standardization and scalability of SIB processes (allowing for 
programs being replicated and adapted to multiple geographies). Besides Social Fi-
nance, a further intermediary called Bridges Ventures as a private investment firm 
(founded in 2002) plays an important role in the British SIB market (e.g. Bugg-Levine 
et al., 2012). The Bridges Social Impact Bond Fund was launched in April 2013 and 
provides investment and support (e.g. with advice) to charities and social enterprises 
(Bridges Ventures, 2015). So it can be stated that in the sense of evolutionary thinking 
the human actors behind these institutions in US and UK first have seen the new envi-
ronment and the opportunities given by SIBs. This knowledge was then translated into 
action on the market, represented by an innovation. 
The largest European economy (measured in terms of GDP), namely Germany, is weak-
ly developed in the impact investing market (only one SIB since 2013 as shown in table 
2), but due to numerous national initiatives, the market has gained momentum since 
2012 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016). Some players (e.g. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Ashoka 
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Deutschland, BMW Stiftung, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau and GLS Bank) are already 
active and prove that SIBs and impact investing have the potential to contribute to so-
cial change in Germany, too (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016; Weber and Scheck, 2012). 
However, it still lacks the necessary institutional infrastructure (e.g. standardized in-
vestment products, investable social projects and intermediaries) compared to the US 
and, above all, the UK, to attract a sufficient number of investors in order to achieve a 
significant market size and penetration (Glänzel and Scheuerle, 2016). These challenges 
are not specific for Germany, but follow a pattern that can also observed in other emerg-
ing impact investing markets (Social Finance, 2016). Accordingly, there is a lack of 
funding and public contracts on the demand side and, therefore, a simultaneous lack of 
sufficiently attractive investment opportunities on the supply side. For political actors 
involved, incentives are missing to launch costly initiatives, whereby an institutional 
change with new formal and informal (e.g. social culture) rules according to North be-
comes difficult. In developing further a functioning market in Germany, the state should 
be positioned in different roles, e.g. legislator, provider of infrastructure, investor and 
customer of social services.  
Finally, the most promising chance for an institutional change by SIBs was established 
on a transnational level in 2013, with the Social Impact Investment Taskforce (hereafter 
SIITF) being established under the UK´s presidency of the G8 (Daggers and Nicholls, 
2016). The reason for the founding of the SIITF was the insight of the G8 states (espe-
cially pushed by the UK in form of the former prime minister David Cameron) that the 
market for impact investing needs to grow even faster referring to the worldwide chal-
lenges in the social sector (Social Impact Investment Taskforce, 2014). This politically 
independent taskforce comprises twenty-two people, including one government official 
and one representative of the social or private sector from seven countries and the EU, 
as well one observer from Australia. In addition, on the national level of the G8 coun-
tries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US) National Advisory 
Boards were established, which consist of representatives of the social economy, fi-
nance, foundations, academia and the public sector, whereby a deep networking of the 
SIB topic can take place. Ultimately, four international expert working groups were 
implemented to address in depth the particular challenges of measuring impact, asset 
allocation, mission in business and international development (Social Impact Invest-
ment Taskforce, 2014). Meanwhile, the Global Social Impact Investment Steering 
Group (hereafter GSG) was established in August 2015 as the successor to the SIITF. 
The GSG is continuing the work of the Taskforce in catalysing a global social impact 
investment market across a wider membership and is working to increase momentum by 
promoting a unified view of impact investment, facilitating knowledge exchange and 
encouraging policy change in national markets (Global Social Impact Investment Steer-
ing Group, 2016). Thus, a global basis for an institutional change can be created. The 
example of the SIITF (and subsequently GSG) shows that, in the evolutionary sense, the 
knowledge (or the known protrusion) about the SIB theme was bundled by the British 
government especially in the form of David Cameron (who once again can be seen as a 
social entrepreneur by the state with its own interests). 
The subsequent table 5 summarizes the essential evolutionary triggers for a positive (or 
slow) system change according to the SIB markets in UK, US and Germany. 
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Evolutionary trigger UK US Germany 
Relevance of social 
entrepreneurship 
Pioneering role in Eu-
rope; even a Social 
Entrepreneurship Unit 
was set up by the gov-
ernment 
Strongly present (social 
entrepreneurship has 
been a fixed term since 
the 1980s mainly 
through the work of Bill 
Drayton, founder of 
Ashoka) 
Less pronounced than in 
Anglo-Saxon countries 
(only popular since the 
end of the 1990s due to 
the start of the Schwab 
foundation) 
Incentives by tax laws Gift Aid (1990/2000), 
Social Investment Tax 
relief (2014) 
none none 
Donation readiness Strongly directed to 
education, poverty con-
trol and health research 
Strongly directed to 
education, poverty con-
trol and health research 
Strongly directed to 
disaster relief and reli-
gious organizations 
Existence of a social 
culture 
Good conditions, which 
were established early 
by the state 
Rather promoted only 
by the former President 
Obama 
Less strongly present 
and promoted by the 
state 
Important intermediar-
ies and human actors 









yes yes yes, but less available 
than in UK and US 
Failed SIB projects none Rikers Island (the first 
SIB project in US) 
none 




positive positive, high reputation 
of entrepreneurship, 
high risk affinity 
Entrepreneurship is still 
less accepted  than in 
Anglo-Saxon countries 
Incentive of the state as 
a social entrepreneur 
State takes on different 
roles: legislator, provid-
er of infrastructure, 
investor or customer of 
social services 
Rather was relevant by 
the former President 
Obama 
Understanding of the 
state as a social entre-
preneur is still missing 
Learning by past SIB Strongly given due to a 
large number of projects 
Given, despite the failed 
Rikers Island project; 
Not available due to 
only one project since 
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projects since 2010 unlike UK less SIBs but 
more volume 
2013 
Member of the SIITF / 
GSG 
yes yes yes 
Budget shortage None Programs of former 
President Obama were 




the state and munici-
palities 
Strongly present Strongly present Still hardly work to-
gether despite federal 
structures 
Table 5: Evolutionary triggers for the SIB markets in UK, US and Germany 
CONCLUSIONS  
SIBs provide an innovative way to finance preventive measures in the social sector with 
the help of private investors. In this article, various examples from international markets 
have shown the feasibility of impact investing based on SIB structures. Nevertheless, 
the occurrence of SIBs is disproportionately allocated, with selected countries (as the 
US and the UK, where 41 out of 60 existing SIBs are located) acting as frontrunners, 
while others (such as Germany) lag behind – in spite of the size and the importance of 
their financial markets and social system even on a global scale. Although the necessary 
know-how, the evidence for the feasibility and first practical experiences exist, infor-
mation is still scarce. To overcome this Catch 22 situation, governments could provide 
particular startup assistance and rulebooks. If the Catch 22 of no-SIB-investments-
without-further-SIB-knowledge / no-further-SIB-knowledge-without-further-SIB-
investments should prevail, temporary governmental support could start with infor-
mation (most basic, by publicly declaring SIBs as desirable initiatives enhancing gen-
eral welfare, more sophisticated by the collection and provision of information). On a 
financial level, the government could enhance SIB attractiveness by amending taxation 
rules, and also by offering subsidizing assistance, e.g. by risk-taking or even subsidizing 
a project. On an institutional level, it could make its commitment visible by joining su-
pranational SIB initiatives (like SIITF).  
During the next five years, several of the current SIB projects will mature, so that more 
data on results (e.g. benefits and costs) of the first generation of SIBs will be obtainable 
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– including both successes and failures. Probably, the evaluation of (returns and risk of) 
this pilot generation will influence the attitude of potential participants significantly. So 
far, SIBs seem to offer a new solution to old and new challenges in the social services 
sector. However, it is still uncertain if they represent the new standard or just a niche 
solution, or if they might disappear from the investment and finance universe complete-
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